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In this paper we consider a new explanation for the often encountered observation that private 
consumption is excessively sensitive to anticipated government expenditures. We show that 
this excess sensitivity arises if consumers are aware of the government’s intertemporal budget 
constraint, but lack exact information on the aggregate economy. Given the strong assumption 
that consumers incorporate the government budget constraint, we test our model in three high 
debt countries where it is more likely that consumers have developed an awareness for 
government issues. In some of these countries and especially during periods of high debt 
accumulation, we observe some excess sensitivity with respect to (lagged) income and 
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The permanent income hypothesis implies that changes in aggregate private consumption are 
unpredictable (see Hall 1978). In reality, however, private consumption changes are generally 
found to be ‘excessively sensitive’ to predictable changes in income and are sometimes found 
to be ‘excessively sensitive’ to predictable changes in government expenditures.  
Excess sensitivity of private consumption with respect to income has been interpreted most 
often by assuming the presence of liquidity constrained consumers (see Campbell and 
Mankiw 1990, 1991). In each period these consumers consume their entire disposable 
income. Since they cannot save nor borrow, this implies that they can only change their 
consumption when changes in income effectively materialize. Thus the possibility emerges 
that consumption changes do occur in response to previously anticipated changes in income.  
Other authors have come up with alternative explanations for the failure of Hall’s random 
walk hypothesis of private consumption at the aggregate level. Gali (1990) considers finite 
lifetimes, whereas Goodfriend (1992), Pischke (1995) and Demery and Duck (2000) assume 
consumers who have imperfect information on aggregate variables.  
Excess sensitivity of private consumption to government expenditures has, to the best of our 
knowledge, only been interpreted in terms of an Edgeworth relationship between private 
consumption and government expenditures. Aschauer (1985) has modified Hall’s Euler 
equation to allow for (Edgeworth) substitutability or complementarity effects between private 
consumption and government expenditures. Existing studies have found different results for 
different countries (Karras 1994, Evans and Karras 1996, Ni 1995). To some extent this is not 
surprising. One may indeed be sceptical about the validity of an Edgeworth relationship at the 
aggregate level since some components of government expenditures are likely to be 
complements to private consumption, while others are likely to be substitutes. Evans and 
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 Karras (1998), for instance, show for a sample of 66 countries that private consumption and 
non-military government spending are generally substitutes or independent, whereas private 
consumption and military spending are better described as complements.  
 
Given these problems it is rather surprising that no alternative explanations for this observed 
excess sensitivity of private consumption to government expenditures have been developed. 
In this paper we interpret this excess sensitivity differently. We focus on the idea of imperfect 
information as developed by Pischke (1995) and Demery and Duck (2000). Imperfect 
information can explain why, in contradiction to the permanent income hypothesis, private 
consumption is observed to be both ‘excessively smooth’ and ‘excessively sensitive’ to 
income (the so-called ‘Deaton paradox’). Moreover, as an innovation of this paper, assuming 
imperfectly informed consumers who incorporate the government budget constraint provides 
an alternative interpretation for the observed excess sensitivity of private consumption to 
government expenditures at the aggregate level.  
 
The failure of the random walk hypothesis of private consumption at the aggregate level can 
occur if individual income and/or the individual’s perception of government expenditures has 
an aggregate and an individual-specific component. Consumers cannot differentiate between 
both components because they do not know the aggregate component. If there is an 
innovation in aggregate income or in government expenditures, this innovation will be partly 
misinterpreted as an innovation in the individual-specific component. Given that the 
aggregate component is more persistent than the individual-specific component, permanent 
income will not be adjusted appropriately and consumption will be too smooth. In the next 
period(s), consumers will notice that the change in income or government expenditures 
  3  
 persists and will adjust consumption again so that it will appear excessively sensitive to 
changes in income and/or government expenditures.  
 
We consider a model with utility maximizing permanent income consumers who 1) are 
imperfectly informed because they do not observe aggregate variables and 2) are aware that 
the government must respect a budget constraint. As far as the first assumption is concerned, 
Pischke (1995) argues that consumers in the US may indeed be imperfectly informed about 
aggregate variables and may have little incentive to obtain this information since calculations 
suggest that the benefits of obtaining aggregate information are rather small compared to the 
costs. As for the second assumption, Lopez et. al. (2000) mention that assuming that 
consumers internalize the government budget constraint ‘imposes formidable requirements on 
agents’ ability to gather and process information’. Especially in our case, where agents are not 
perfectly informed, this assumption requires a justification. We believe that the level and 
increase of the government debt in the economy may play a crucial role. It is likely that 
consumers in high-debt countries will benefit relatively more from information on   
government financing issues than consumers in countries without a problematic debt history. 
They are therefore more likely to develop an awareness for the government budget constraint 
even if they have no incentive to obtain or to use exact aggregate information on taxes and 
government expenditures in their calculations. Some authors have noted that consumers in 
high-debt countries tend to be more aware of the government budget constraint (see for 
instance Nicoletti 1988, 1992; Dalamagas 1993, Pozzi 2003). The knowledge of the future tax 
implications of debt may have a higher value for consumers in high-debt countries because 
they may feel that the ‘day of reckoning’ is imminent. Assuming that the idea of imperfectly 
informed consumers incorporating the government budget constraint is relevant to explain 
excess sensitivity of private consumption with respect to government expenditures, we would 
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 especially expect it to hold in countries characterized by a problematic debt situation
1. 
Therefore we estimate our model for a number of OECD countries (Belgium, Italy and 
Greece) where the debt to GDP ratio has increased rapidly since the mid-seventies. This can 
be seen in figure 1 for Italy and Belgium where the net debt to GDP ratio has reached very 
high levels, even exceeding 1 during the nineties. In figure 2 we present the evolution of the 
gross debt to GDP ratio for Greece (for which no data on the net debt are available). We can 
see that the Greek debt situation has become problematic especially since the early eighties 
(exceeding 50% during the mid-eighties).  
 























































































    Source: OECD (Economic Outlook CD ROM 2001 Vol. 2).             
 
The remainder of this paper is as follows. In section 2 we present our model which generates 
the possibility that private consumption changes are excessively sensitive to (lagged) pre-tax 
income and government expenditure changes. In section 3 we discuss an empirically testable 
consumption function as well as the data that we use and a number of methodological issues. 
In section 3 we also present our empirical results. Section 4 concludes. 
  5  
 
                                                           












































































































Source: OECD (Economic Outlook CD ROM 2001 Vol.2). 
 
 
2. The Model. 
 
We consider an economy with the following characteristics: 
  
1) The economy is populated by a very large number (n) of infinitely lived utility maximizing 
permanent income consumers. Each has a quadratic utility function
2. We assume that the  
subjective rate of time preference for all consumers is equal to the constant real interest rate in 
the economy.  
2) The macro structure of the economy is given by the following three equations which 
describe the processes for aggregate per capita pre-tax income and government expenditures 
and the intertemporal government budget constraint, 
                                                           
2 Assuming a utility function of the constant relative risk aversion type will introduce precaution. Though no 
closed-form solution exists in this case without further assumptions, precaution is then usually captured by 
allowing the consumer’s discount rate for future disposable income to be larger than the discount rate of the 
government (i.e the real interest rate) with the difference reflecting a risk premium (see Muellbauer and 
Lattimore 1995). This is equivalent to the assumption of finite horizons (see Blanchard 1985). In these cases the 
incorporation of the government intertemporal budget constraint will be incomplete. In this paper we choose to 
focus on consumers who do incorporate the government budget fully but who have incomplete information sets. 
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In these equations yt is per capita pre-tax income, gt is per capita government expenditures, tt 
is per capita net taxes, r is the exogenous
3 real interest rate and bt-1 is per capita government 
debt. The latter is measured at the end of period t-1. Eq. (3) is the intertemporal budget 
constraint of the government. We assume that the government does not engage in Ponzi 
games so that   holds. The intertemporal budget is balanced. In (1) 
and (2) we assume that pre-tax income and government expenditures can be written as the 
sum of a temporary component (white noise terms   and   respectively) and a permanent 
component. The latter components are random walks given by, 
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where   and   are white noise terms (see for instance Deaton 1992). Note that our results 
are not dependent upon our assumption of the processes for pre-tax income and government 






                                                           
3  We assume that the real interest rate is determined on the international capital market and is thus not 
influenced by (peoples’ expectations about) the level of government borrowing. 
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 3) At the micro level, pre-tax income and net taxes of each consumer i, yit and tit can be 
written as the sum of aggregate per capita pre-tax income and net taxes respectively and an 
individual-specific component. Furthermore, imperfectly informed consumers are assumed to 
observe per capita government expenditures with noise (see below). This is captured by the 
following equations, 
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where ,  and  are individual-specific white noise terms. These terms are independently 








4) If consumers were perfectly informed they would observe their own past consumption and 
their own current and past income and taxes. They would observe government expenditures 
without noise, thus  . They would also observe past aggregate per capita consumption 
and current and past aggregate per capita income, taxes and government expenditures (both 
permanent and transitory components). At the end of period t,  when deciding on 
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it-1 is i’s consumption in period t-1 
and ct-1  is total per capita consumption in period t-1. xt is a three-dimensional vector (yt, tt, gt) 
and xit is the vector (yit, tit, git) 
4.  
 
4  Note that bt, bt-1,… is also a part of the information set of a perfectly informed consumer given the knowledge 
of gt,gt-1,…and tt,tt-1,…The same argument can be made for financial wealth (see appendix A). 
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 In this paper we assume that all consumers are imperfectly informed about the aggregate 
economy. At the end of period t, when deciding on consumption, imperfectly informed 




it I I = { } ,... , ..., , 1 2 1 − − − t t t t x x c c . We make the additional  
assumption that these imperfectly informed consumers are aware of the intertemporal budget 
constraint of the government. We justify both assumptions by noting that consumers may 
value knowledge of the government budget constraint (e.g. because the level of government 
debt makes it worthwhile to ‘pierce the government veil’) without thinking it is necessary to 
know or to use the exact value of the aggregate variables in their calculations. Thus, we do 
not assume that consumers cannot obtain the aggregate information, we just assume that they 
do not value it enough to collect it or to use it (see Pischke, 1995 and Deaton, 1992)
5. We 
capture this idea by assuming that consumers’ expectations of their future tax liabilities are 
determined by their expectations of future (noisy) government expenditures. More precisely, 
we assume that   where   is 
the expectations operator conditional on the information set   and   is the expectations 
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Our assumptions have the following implications, 
 
1) Since n is large and since there is independence across consumers, we have that the macro 
structure and the micro structure are compatible.  
 
2) The change in consumption of each of the the n consumers can be written as (see appendix 
A), 
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where i=1,…,n and   is the expectations operator conditional on the information set   
(where k=PE or IM). Consumers make their decision at the end of t using the information set 







3) To incorporate the assumption that consumers do not observe aggregate variables, we use 
Eq. (1), (2), (4), (5), (6) and (8) to derive the following equations (see appendix B), 
 
(10)    1 − − + = ∆ it it it y y θη η  
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where the parameters θ (>0) and  φ (>0) are functions of the (relative) variances of aggregate 
(permanent and transitory) shocks and idiosyncratic shocks (see appendix B). ηit and µit 
reflect the innovations in consumer i’s own pre-tax income and perception of government 
expenditures. These innovations are white noise and have a variance that is constant across 
consumers. In appendix B we show that the higher is the variance of the permanent shocks in 
pre-tax income and government expenditures, the lower will be the values of θ and φ. In this 
case, as we can see from (10) and (11), innovations in period t that lead to changes in yit and 
git will almost not be undone in the next period.   
Consumers thus experience shocks without knowing the exact nature of these innovations 
(aggregate persistent, aggregate temporary or idiosyncratic). Obviously, this is problematic 
when they calculate their permanent income. Since temporary aggregate and individual-
                                                                                                                                                                                     
5  As noted by Deaton (1992-page 40), individuals have public access to aggregate variables. There is however 
no guarantee that they will use such information. 
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 specific shocks are white noise (Eqs. (1), (2), (6), (7) and (8)), they call for a small adjustment 
of permanent income. Aggregate variables may however also be affected by permanent 
shocks (see Eqs. (4) and (5)) which demand a larger adjustment of permanent income.  
 
Perfectly informed consumers. 
 
If consumers had perfect information about the aggregate economy and thus had information 
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This is the standard result that not only at the individual level (see Eq. 9) but also in the 
aggregate, perfectly informed permanent income consumers only respond to unanticipated 
shocks (‘surprises’). Since they incorporate the government budget constraint, tax shocks do 
not enter Eq. (12). 
 
Imperfectly informed consumers. 
 
In appendix D we show that if all consumers are imperfectly informed but do take into 
account the government budget constraint, the change in per capita consumption is given by, 
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As can be seen from (13), the lack of information on aggregate variables causes consumption 
to be excessively sensitive to (lags in) income (see Pischke 1995 and Demery and Duck 
2000). Consumption is also excessively sensitive to (lags in) government expenditures. 
Consumption does not respond only to ‘surprises’ in income and government expenditures as 
is the case when consumers have complete information (see Eq. (12)). For instance, if in 
period t there is a permanent shock in government expenditures, this will lead to a change in 
git  , git+1,…. Consumers take this into account when determining consumption since they 
incorporate the government budget constraint. They will be uncertain about how much 
government expenditures have augmented since these expenditures are observed with noise. 
Consumers will therefore interpret the shock only partly as a permanent shock in aggregate gt 
and will thus underestimate the persistence of the shock. They will change their estimate of 
permanent income insufficiently. Consumption in t will adjust, but the adjustment will be too 
small. The reaction depends on the relative variance of idiosyncratic and temporary aggregate 
versus permanent aggregate shocks. This can be seen from equation (13) where the change in 
consumption in period t due to a change in government expenditures in t depends on b . 
From appendix B we can derive that if the variance of   is small compared to the variances 
of  and  , the consumer will expect that shocks are mainly temporary or idiosyncratic and 
φ(>0) will be relatively large. At the aggregate level we then have   and  
the reaction (of all consumers) to aggregate (permanent or temporary) shocks within the same 
period will be relatively small. In the next period(s), as the effect of a permanent shock is 
observed to persist, consumers will again be surprised and permanent income and 
consumption will be adjusted again. Consumption will then be excessively sensitive to lagged 
changes in government expenditures. The intuition for income is similar to that for 
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Note that our results on excess sensitivity of income and government expenditures are 
dependent on the imperfect information assumption at the individual level and on the 
aggregation bias that results from it. Consumption changes are unpredictable at the individual 
level, not at the aggregate level. We refer to appendix D for more on this. Working with a 
representative permanent income consumer would never generate excess sensitivity because 
the optimization problem of a representative consumer always implies unpredictable 
consumption changes at the aggregate level.  
Note also that our results are not dependent on the presence of temporary aggregate shocks. 
We assume specifications like (1) and (2) with permanent and transitory shocks to leave room 
for predictability of income and government expenditure changes, given the random walk 
assumption of the permanent components. Assuming more general univariate processes for 
income and government expenditure changes would give similar results leading to private 
consumption changes that are excessively sensitive to (lagged) pre-tax income and 
government expenditure changes 
6.  
 
3. Methodology and results. 
 
3.1 A testable consumption function, estimation issues and data issues. 
 
Specifications in which the change in private consumption is a function of current and lagged 
changes in pre-tax income and government expenditures can be obtained from different  
                                                           
6  Demery and Duck (2000) obtain a similar result using an ARMA(p,q) for the change in aggregate income. In 
fact as long as   and   are covariance-stationary we can (by using the Wold theorem – see Hamilton 
1994) write equations of the form 
it y ∆ it g ∆
it it u L y ) ( ψ µ + =
it g
∆  where uit is white noise and where ψ(L) is an infinite-
order lag polynomial with ψ0=1 (and similar for ∆ ). Assuming the underlying parameters of the aggregate 
processes are such that the lag polynomials are invertible, we can obtain an expression similar to (13). 
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 assumed income and government expenditure processes. Thus, it may be too restrictive to test 
the model by imposing the assumed processes for income and government expenditures on 
the data 
7. In appendix E we therefore report the results of estimating Eq.(13) directly (i.e.  the 
estimates for θ and φ) while in this section we estimate a more general consumption function,  
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where γ is a constant and the expected signs of the parameters are  >0,  >0 (for 
j=1,…,q)  (for j=1,…,q). Note that strictly speaking an infinite number of lagged
y






j δ t y ∆  
and   terms should be included in (14), which is obviously not possible. Therefore, we 
follow the approach of Demery and Duck (2000) and we add a finite number q of lags. Given 
that enough lags of 
t g ∆
t y ∆  and  are included we should find no increase in likelihood if 
lagged  terms are added to this equation. Lags of 
t g ∆
t c ∆ t c ∆ added to our empirical specification 
(14) are indeed never significant and do not affect our results. All our results reported (for all 
countries) are for q=1 since using Wald tests we can easily reduce the number of lags to that 
number. We never find significant parameter estimates on  j t y − ∆ and  for j=2,3,…. j t g − ∆
8. 
Given their endogeneity we must instrument  t y ∆  and  t g ∆ . The error term  can be 
interpreted as a preference shock or as resulting from transitory components in the level of 
consumption. In the latter case it will follow an MA(1) process and instruments must be  
c
t ε
                                                           
7 Pischke finds that individual income changes are well described by an MA(2) Process. As noted by Deaton 
(1992), an MA(1) process for individual income changes, as in Eq. (10), may be a relatively good approximation 
to reality. This says nothing of Eq. (11) for government expenditures however. 
8 Note that specification q=2 does generally not strongly affect the significance of our results (the standard errors 
and parameter estimates of the current value and first lag of  y ∆ and  g ∆ remain relatively stable). The 
significance of our results starts deteriorating however when more (insignificant) lags are added. 
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 lagged at least twice to obtain consistent estimation. Stated differently, the variables ∆  and 
 must also be instrumented. This is also necessary if we consider the possibility of time 
aggregation (Working 1960). We use lags of 
1 − t y
1 − ∆ t g
t c ∆ , t y ∆  and  t g ∆ as instruments in our 
regressions. 
 
To estimate (14) we use semi-annual data for 3 high-debt OECD countries (Belgium, Italy 
and Greece) from 1973:1 –1997:2. We take 1973 as a first observation because it marks the 
first oil shock. This crisis and the fiscal and debt problems that it provoked, may have 
increased consumers’ awareness of government issues. Using semi-annual data gives the 
possibility to estimate (14) over relatively small subperiods and to capture the dynamics 
implied by the lag structure in (14). We would prefer quarterly data but these are not available 
for all countries for all necessary variables. More details on the construction of the used 
variables are given in table 1. 
 
Table 1. Data and data sources. 
ct  Real aggregate per capita private consumption. Taken from OECD Economic Outlook (CD ROM 2001 Vol.2) and 
reported in real terms with code CPV (deflated by implicit deflator for aggregate consumption, 1995=100). 
yt  Real per capita pre-tax income. Calculated using variables from OECD Economic Outlook (CD ROM 2001 Vol.2). 
Multiply the wage rate in the business sector (with code WR) by employment in the business sector (with code 
ETB) and then add government wages (with code CGAA). Then deflate this sum by the private consumption 
deflator (with code PCP, 1995=100). Note that this measure cannot be constructed on a semi-annual basis for 
Belgium before 1980. For Belgium we therefore use wages and salaries (code WAGE in OECD statistics) which is 
basically the same and which is available from 1973 onwards. We also deflate this series with PCP. Estimations 
with both measures (after 1980) are practically identical. We name these proxies Y2. 
Since this type of proxy cannot be constructed for Greece we also proxy pre-tax income by real per capita GDP 
with code GDP ( see for instance Evans and Karras 1996, 1998). We name this proxy Y1. 
gt  Real per capita government consumption plus real per capita government investment. Taken from OECD Economic 
Outlook (CD ROM 2001 Vol.2). Real government consumption is reported with code CGV (deflated by implicit 
deflator for government consumption, 1995=100). Real government investment is reported with code IGV (deflated 
by implicit deflator for government investment, 1995=100). 
Note: all variables are seasonally adjusted. Per capita measures are obtained after dividing by total population. 
Semi-annual data for total population are constructed by dividing the data for the population between 15 and 64 
years of age (which are available on a semi-annual basis in OECD Economic Outlook CD ROM 2001 Vol.2 with 
code POPT) by the ratio of the population of 15-64 to total population, which can be calculated on a yearly basis. 
The latter is calculated using total population (available on a yearly basis only) from OECD Economic Outlook 
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 3.2 Estimation results. 
 
Note first that we do reject the hypothesis of a unit root in all series used for ∆ ,∆  and  t c t y t g ∆  
for all countries and over all sample periods considered. Unit root tests are not reported but 
they are available upon request. 
 
We report our results for Eq. (14) with q=1 using the instrumental variables (IV) approach in 
tables 2 (Italy), 3 (Greece) and 4 (Belgium). Note that specifications with q=2 do generally 
lead to the same conclusions, though the additional lags are never significant. For each 
country we consider subperiods and a number of different variables to proxy pre-tax income 
(Y1,Y2). We use instrument sets containing the second to the fifth lag of  ,  and  t c ∆ t y ∆ t g ∆  
when estimating our equation. Note that changing the number of instruments in all these cases 
does only marginally affect our results. 
 
































































Notes: Newey-West standard errors between brackets (lag truncation = 3).  * indicates significance at the 10% 
level. ** indicates significance at the 5% level. The instrument set contains lags 2 to 5 of ∆ ,  and  .  t c t y ∆ t g ∆
a DW indicates the Durbin-Watson test statistic. 
b Y1 is real per capita GDP used as a proxy for yt ,Y2 is real per 
capita total wages used as a proxy for yt. 
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 Table 2 presents the results for Italy. In the first equation we estimate (14) over the period 
1973:01-1997:02 with real per capita GDP (Y1) as a proxy for yt. All coefficients have the 
expected sign, except  which is positive. This contradicts the intuition of the model. In the 








Note that if we estimate (14) over smaller sample periods as in the third equation, the results 
remain the same. We report the results for the period 1982:01-1997:02 because in 1982 the 
net debt to GDP ratio reached 50% and a long uninterrupted increase followed (see figure 1 in 
section 1). The results are robust to estimation over other sample periods starting in the early 
to mid eighties however.  
We thus find excess sensitivity with respect to current pre-tax income and government 
expenditures and with respect to the first lag in income. Lagged changes in government 
expenditures do not enter the regression in a significant way. A possible explanation for this 
could be that most of the adjustment in government expenditures occurs immediately, for 
instance in the first quarter after the shock. This could also explain why  is quite large in 
absolute terms (especially in Eqs (1) and (2)). Consumers may think that changes in 
government expenditures are usually rather persistent so that adjustment occurs fast and over 
a small period. Quarterly data might be more useful to capture the adjustment. However, due 
to data limitations, only semi-annual data are available. 
g
0 δ
Note that the usual interpretation for the observation that private consumption responds 
negatively to government expenditure changes would be that private consumption and 
government expenditures are Edgeworth substitutes. As noted earlier, at the aggregate level, 
there may be reason to question such a relationship. The finding that lagged pre-tax income 
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 enters the regression significantly provides support for the alternative explanation considered 
in this paper.  
Additional support for the idea of this paper is given by the results for Greece in table 3. For 
Greece we can only use Y1 as a proxy for real per capita pre-tax labour income. In the first 
equation we estimate (14) over the period 1973:01-1997:02. No variables are significant 
except current income. The Durbin Watson statistic being smaller than 1, our consumption 
function seems to be rather misspecified for this period. Note however that during the 
seventies and most of the early eighties the debt ratio in Greece remained relatively low (see 
figure 2 in section 1). If we estimate (14) over the period 1985:01-1997:02, a period of high 
debt levels (almost exceeding 50% in 1985) and a very strong increase in the debt ratio, 
another picture emerges. We find results strongly in line with these for Italy. Again, we find 
excess sensitivity with respect to current pre-tax income and government expenditures and the 
first lag in income. We do not find a significant influence from lagged changes in government 
expenditures. The Durbin-Watson statistic is much closer to 2 this time.  
 




















































Notes: Newey-West standard errors between brackets (lag truncation = 3). * indicates significance at the 10% 
level. ** indicates significance at the 5% level. The instrument set contains lags 2 to 5 of ∆ ,  and  .  t c t y ∆ t g ∆
 
a DW indicates the Durbin-Watson test statistic. 
b Y1 is real per capita GDP used as a proxy for yt . 
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 Far less convincing are the results for Belgium, however (table 4). From figure 1 in section 1 
we note that of all countries considered Belgium has the highest debt level. Our results are not 
reflecting this. In the first equation (full sample with Y1) only current income enters 
significantly. The Durbin-Watson test is very low suggesting model misspecification. In the 
second equation we use real per capita total wages (Y2) as a proxy for yt. Again only current 
income is significant, though current government expenditures have the expected sign. Using 
subsamples does not improve the results. 
 




































































Notes: Newey-West standard errors between brackets (lag truncation = 3). * indicates significance at the 10% 
level. ** indicates significance at the 5% level. The instrument set contains lags 2 to 5 of ∆ ,  and  .  t c t y ∆ t g ∆
a DW indicates the Durbin-Watson test statistic. 
b Y1 is real per capita GDP used as a proxy for yt ,Y2 is real per 
capita total wages used as a proxy for yt. 
 
Summarizing, though our results are not conclusive, there are indications that our model can 
explain certain observations of excess sensitivity of consumption to income and government 
expenditures in some countries during some periods.  
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 4. Conclusions. 
 
In this paper we consider an alternative to the Edgeworth interpretation of excess sensitivity 
of aggregate consumption to anticipated changes in government expenditures building on the 
idea of imperfect information as developed by Pischke (1995). Given the theoretical problems 
of the Edgeworth concept at the aggregate level and the disparity in empirical results, we find 
it surprising that, to the best of our knowledge, no alternative interpretations have been given 
to this form of excess sensitivity in the literature. 
We basically consider a model of Ricardian Equivalence under imperfect information where 
rational utility maximizing permanent income consumers are assumed to be imperfecly 
informed about the aggregate economy. They do however (imperfectly) incorporate the 
intertemporal budget constraint of the government. At the aggregate level this generates 
excess sensitivity of private consumption changes to predictable pre-tax income and 
government expenditure changes.  
In the empirical section we estimate a consumption function implied by the model for three 
high debt countries (Italy, Greece and Belgium). We concentrate on high debt countries since, 
as suggested by existing research, it may be expected that consumers in these countries value 
information on government budget issues more than consumers in other countries.  
Our findings suggest that in Italy and Greece (especially during periods of high debt 
accumulation) private consumption changes are indeed excessively sensitive to (lagged) 
changes in pre-tax income and government expenditures. Our results are not fully conclusive 
however since for Belgium there are no indications that the model provides a satisfying 
approximation to reality. Thus we do not wish to oversell our alternative explanation but we 
consider it a good starting point to consider more alternatives to the standard Edgeworth 
interpretation of  excess sensitivity of private consumption to government expenditures. 
  20  
 References. 
 
Aschauer, D.A. (1985). Fiscal policy and aggregate demand. American Economic Review, 
75(1) :117-127. 
Blanchard, O.J. (1985). Debt, deficits and finite horizons. Journal of Political Economy, 
93(2) :223-247. 
Campbell, J.Y. and Mankiw, G.N. (1990). Permanent income, current income and 
consumption. Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, 8 : 265-279. 
Campbell, J.Y and Mankiw, N.G. (1991). The response of consumption to income. A cross  
country investigation. European Economic Review 35 : 723-767. 
Dalamagas (1993). How efficient is the substitution of debt for taxes in influencing demand ?  
Applied Economics 25 : 295-303. 
Deaton, A. (1992). Understanding Consumption. Oxford University Press. 
Demery, D. and Duck, N.W. (2000). Incomplete information and the time series behaviour of 
consumption. Journal of applied Econometrics 15 : 355-366. 
Evans, P. and Karras, G. (1996). Private and government consumption with liquidity 
constraints. Journal of international money and finance 15(2) : 255-266. 
Evans, P. and Karras, G. (1998). Liquidity constraints and the substitutability between private 
and government consumption  : the role of military and non-military spending. Economic 
Inquiry XXXVI : 203-214. 
Gali, J. (1990). Finite horizons, life cycle savings and time series evidence on consumption. 
Journal of monetary economics 26: 433-452. 
Goodfriend, M. (1992). Information-Aggregation Bias. American Economic Review, 82  : 
508-519. 
  21  
 Hall, R.E (1978). Stochastic implications of the life cycle-permanent income hypothesis  : 
theory and evidence. Journal of Political Economy, 86(6) : 971- 987. 
Hamilton, J.D (1994). Time Series Analysis. Princeton University Press. 
Karras, G. (1994). Government spending and private consumption  : some international 
evidence. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking  26(1) : 9-22. 
Lopez, H.J., Schmidt-Hebbel, K. and Servén, L. (2000). How effective is fiscal policy in  
raising national saving? Review of Economics and Statistics, 82(2) : 226-238. 
Muellbauer, J. and Lattimore, R. (1995). The consumption function  : a theoretical and 
empirical overview. In Pesaran, M.H. and Wickens, M., editors, Handbook of Applied 
Econometrics, pages 221-311. Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, UK. 
Ni, S. (1995). An empirical analysis on the substitutability between private consumption and 
government purchases. Journal of Monetary Economics, 36 :593-605. 
Nicoletti, G. (1988). Private consumption, inflation and the ‘debt neutrality hypothesis’ : the 
case of eight OECD countries. OECD Department of Economics and Statistics Working 
Paper, number 50. 
Nicoletti, G. (1992). Is tax-discounting stable over time ? Oxford Bulletin of Economics and 
Statistics, 54(2) : 121-144. 
OECD (2001). All data from Economic Outlook CDROM version 2001/2 . 
Pischke, J. (1995). Individual income, incomplete information and aggregate consumption. 
Econometrica 63 (4): 805-840.  
Pozzi, L. (2003). Tax discounting in a high debt economy. Forthcoming in Oxford Bulletin of 
Economics and Statistics. 
Working, H. (1960). Note on the correlation of first differences of averages in a random  
chain. Econometrica 28 : 916-918. 
 
  22  
 Appendix A: Derivation of (9). 
 
Given the quadratic utility assumption and the assumption that the subjective rate of time 
preference equals the constant real interest rate, the first order condition at time t can be 
written as (∀j), 
 
(A1)      it j it
k
it c c E = +
 
with k=IM (or PE if consumers are perfectly informed) and i=1,…,n. This is the standard 
random walk result (see Hall 1978). The period t budget constraint of these consumers can be 
written as, 
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where wit is consumer i’s financial wealth (including government bonds) measured at the end 













− − + + = +
00
1 ) ( ) 1 ( ) 1 (
jj







j t y E r w c E r
 
Substituting (A1) into (A3) we obtain, 
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Substituting the budget constraint (A2) written for t-1 into (A4), we obtain 
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Lagging (A4) one period, multiplying both sides by 1+r and extracting the term for j=0 from 
the summation, we obtain, 
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Rearranging terms, (A6) can also be written as, 
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Subtracting (A7) from (A5) we obtain (9) in the main text. 
 
Appendix B: Derivation of (10) and (11). 
 
We focus on the derivation of (10), the derivation of (11) is completely identical. Substituting 
(1) and then (4) into (6), and rewriting the result in first differences, we obtain, 
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 In (B1) we have a combination of various white noise errors. To capture the fact that 
consumers do not observe aggregate variables, we can write this combination of errors as an 
MA(1) process,  
 










t v θη η ε ε ε ε
 
with it η  being a white noise term with a variance that is constant across consumers. The value 
of θ that ensures the white noise structure of  it η , is obtained if we equate the first-order 
autocorrelations of both sides of (B2) 
9. This leads to 
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Eq. (B3) is a quadratic of the form   with a=c=1 and  0
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. To have at least one real solution θ* the condition must hold that 
. This condition always holds. Note that from (B3) it is obvious that θ>0. The two roots 
are given by  ) 4 )( 2 / 1 (
2
1 − + − = b b θ  and  ) 4 )(
2 − − − b b 2 / 1 ( 2 = θ . Using the solution θ* 
into (B2) and substituting this into (B1) we obtain, 
 
(B4)    1 * − − + = ∆ it it it y y η θ η  
                                                           
9 Where we use the assumption that there is no correlation between permanent aggregate, temporary aggregate 
and idiosyncratic shocks (not contemporaneous and not at any lead nor lag). 
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which equals (10) in the main text. Note that only with the root θ2 we have θ2<1. This is the 
invertibility condition that guarantees that from (B4) we can write, 
 
(B5)      ∑
∞
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it y a θ η
 
where θ = θ*=θ2 and  .    y a
y 1 ) 1 (
− − − = θ
 
In exactly the same way we can derive Eq. (11) in the main text. We can write, 
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with φ>0. Note that only the second root φ2 will satisfy the invertibility condition φ2<1 so that 
we can write from (11), 
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where   and  .  2
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Appendix C: Derivation of  (12). 
 
From the main text we know that perfectly informed consumers observe all aggregate 
variables (information set  ). We start from Eq. (9) into which we substitute Eqs. (6) and 
PE
it I
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 (7) written for period t+j. Substituting out taxes by means of the budget constraint (3), we 
obtain, 
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Using Eqs. (1),(2),(4) and (5) into (C1) we obtain, 
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Summing Eq. (C2) over all n consumers makes the idiosyncratic shocks disappear. We obtain 
Eq. (12) in the main text. 
 
Appendix D: Derivation of (13). 
 
At the end of period t  imperfectly informed consumers have information set  . We also 
know that these consumers form expectations according to 
. Substituting this into Eq. (9) 
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We first put (D1) into a different form. Note that we can write (D1) as, 
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 (D2)  














1 ) )( ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) )( ( ) 1 (
j













it g y E E r r g y E E r c
 
The second term of (D2) can also be written as  . 
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Substituting Eqs. (10) and (11) into (D3) leads to 
 




it b b c µ η − = ∆
 
where   >0 (given that it follows from app. B that 0<θ<1), 
>0 (given that it follows from app.B that 0<φ<1). 
1 ) 1 )( 1 (
− + − + = r r b
y θ
1 ) 1 )(
− + − + r r φ 1 ( = b
g
Substituting Eqs. (B5) and (B6) into (D4) and aggregating over the n consumers leads to (13) 
in the main text. 
 
Note from (D4) that at the individual level the change in consumption is white noise. If in 
period t a persistent aggregate shock occurs, consumption will be adjusted. In the following 
period, due to the persistence of the shock, the consumer will again be surprised. The 
consumption change is thus orthogonal to the information set of the imperfectly informed 
consumer, but not orthogonal to last period’s aggregate shock. Note that it is assumed that 
consumers never learn about the aggregate persistent shocks. Given that calculations by 
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 Pischke (1995) suggest that for consumers in the US the costs of obtaining aggregate 
information may be far greater than the benefits, it seems plausible that consumers choose to 
remain ignorant indefinitely (see Deaton 1992).  
At the aggregate level consumption changes are not white noise, however. If we aggregate Eq. 
(D4) over all n consumers we obtain   where   and 




















) / 1 ( µ µ it η  and  it µ are white noise,  t η  and  t µ are not. To see 
this, we can use (B2) and (B6). The presence of the terms in  and  forces the selection of 





it η  and it µ . On aggregation, 




it ε t η  and  t µ will not be 
white noise.  
 
Appendix E: Estimation of Eq. (13). 
 
In this appendix we estimate the parameters θ and φ directly from Eq. (13). We first rewrite 
Eq. (13) in a different form. Note that from (B4) we can write   where 
L is the lag operator. We can do the same for government expenditures, so that we have 
. Substituting both expressions in (D4), multiplying both sides by 
1 ) 1 )( (
− − − ∆ = L y yit it θ η
1 ) 1 )( (
− − − ∆ = L g git it φ µ
) 1 )( 1 ( L L φ θ − −  and aggregating
10, we obtain, 
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 In table E1 we report the results of the estimation of Eq.(E1) over the indicated sample 
periods for Italy, Greece and Belgium. We use real per capita wages for yt for Italy and 
Belgium (Y2) and real per capita GDP for Greece (Y1). We report the results obtained for the 
estimation of θ and φ with imputed values for y, g (which are the averages of ∆yt and ∆gt over 
the sample period) and r. We set r=0.02 in all estimations, but the results are not sensitive to 
the use of other values for r in the interval 0.01-0.05. 
 
Table E1. IV estimates of Eq. (E1) with r=0.02. 
 Coefficient  N  Obs 











































Notes: Newey-West standard errors between brackets (lag truncation = 3). * indicates significance at the 10% 
level. ** indicates significance at the 5% level. The instrument set contains lags 2 to 5 of  ,∆  and  t c ∆ t y t g ∆ . 
Y2 is used for Italy and Belgium; Y1 is used for Greece (see table 1 for exact definitions). 
 
From the results in table E1 we note that the estimates for θ are significant and plausible (i.e. 
between 0 and 1) in all cases considered. The estimates for φ are insignificant for Italy but 
have significant values between 0 and 1 for the other countries. Note that whereas the point 
estimates for θ are very similar over the different countries, the point estimates for φ are very 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
10 Note that the conditions θ<1 and φ<1 are not necessary here (values larger than 1 would be rather unrealistic 
however). This also implies that b
y and b
g could be negative. 
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 different (close to 0 for Italy, close to 0.5 for Greece and close to 1 for Belgium). The point 
estimates for θ are all relatively close to 1. In terms of the model this implies a relatively high 
variance of the transitory and/or individual-specific components in income (see Eq. 13) so 
that consumers may think that changes in income are usually not very persistent. Permanent 
income and consumption will not be adjusted very much in the period of the shock and will 
adjust relatively slowly in the consequent periods.  
The result that φ is relatively low in Italy is more or less in accordance with the results found 
in table 2 where a more general consumption function is estimated (Eq. 14) and where the 
lagged changes in government expenditures are insignificant. The variance of permanent 
shocks in government expenditures may be relatively high so that consumers may think that 
changes in government expenditures are usually rather persistent so that adjustment occurs 
fast and over a small period (see Eq. 13 in the paper to see this). More or less the same 
conclusion can be drawn for Greece if we estimate over the period 1985:01-1997:02 (the 
point estimate for φ is still lower than 0.5 and significant in this case). In the other cases 
(Greece 1973:01-1997:02 and Belgium over both sample periods considered) we find 
relatively high values for φ. These cases coincide with general estimations (Eq.14) of very 
poor quality (see the discussion in the main text). Rather than taking these estimates for φ 
(and the large differences across countries which are implausible) seriously, we conclude that 
these results may also be due to the fact that the estimation of (13) and (E1) may be too 
restrictive (especially the process for government expenditures assumed in the model – see 
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